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MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 2009
Foreign Contacts and the First Amendment
I am editing a paper concerning the relationship between territory  and the First Amendment, which I hope to
post to SSRN next month.  The paper will examine a variety  of restrictions on cross-border information
exchange, including laws that limit contacts between domestic speakers and foreign audiences and
organizations.  It will also examine efforts to "export" the First Amendment bey ond the nation's borders, as
something akin to a universal norm. 
Contacts between domestic speakers and foreign audiences, organizations, and would-be collaborators have
obviously  increased substantially  owing to globalization and digitization.  Many  laws and regulations that
impose restrictions on cross-border information exchange, including travel bans and trade laws, have been
liberalized or repealed over the past few decades.  This is not to say  that we have "open borders" insofar as
informational materials and foreign audiences are concerned.  U.S. laws and regulations continue to impose
significant restrictions on cross-border travel and information exchange, many  of which would be
problematic from a First Amendment standpoint but for the fact that they  are imposed at the nation's
borders.  Cross-border information flow is affected by  strict licensing requirements, subject matter rev iew of
certain materials, trade embargoes, and limits on the export (and import) of materials, data, and information
that may  implicate national security  concerns. 
Contacts between domestic speakers and foreign contacts can raise serious diplomatic and security
concerns.  Alien scholars and other foreign speakers have no First Amendment or other constitutional right
to enter the country  for any  purpose, including what would otherwise be lawful speech and association
activ ities.  The government's power to determine who may  enter U.S. territory  is subject to few, if any , limits. 
Contacts between domestic speakers and foreign organizations that are believed to be involved in terrorist
activ ity  have come under increasing scrutiny .  The State Department has the power to designate
certain organizations "foreign terrorist organizations" (FTO).  Charities and other organizations have
challenged these laws, with relatively  little success, on vagueness, overbreadth, and First Amendment
grounds.  In a case now pending before the Supreme Court (Holder v . Humanitarian Law Project), several
domestic organizations that wish to collaborate with foreign organizations designated as FTOs are challenging
federal laws that prohibit the prov ision of "training," "expert adv ice or assistance," "serv ice," and "personnel"
to foreign terrorist organizations.  In their opening brief, the organizations argue that these criminal
prov isions suppress "pure political speech," including the "prov ision of training in the use of humanitarian and
international law for the peaceful resolution of disputes."  At the very  least, the organizations argue that the
Court should limit the statutory  prohibitions to “"spech intended to further a group's illegal ends."   
The proposed limiting construction would likely  avoid the most serious First Amendment questions posed by
the statutory  prohibitions on material assistance.  This route may  well be appealing to a majority .  But let's
assume the Court reaches the First Amendent questions.  Does the First Amendment apply  with equal force to
communications and associations involv ing foreign organizations, particularly  those designated as FTOs? 
Some thoughts on this issue after the break.
The brief, which is very  well written and argued, assumes that the First Amendment applies with full force to
the communications and associations in question.  In a paragraph on pp. 46-47 , the organizations argue that
the mere fact that the speech in question "implicates foreign affairs" does not take it outside the First
Amendment.  Fair enough.  The organizations further assert that "self-government includes foreign as well as
domestic affairs."  No argument there either.  Certainly , domestic speakers' comments regarding foreign
affairs are protected speech.  Finally , the organizations' brief states that "[i]nternational communications are a
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central aspect of the robust public debate that the First Amendment is designed to protect."  Putting aside that
some of the communications at issue may  actually  take place in domestic venues and be directed to domestic
audiences, is it so clear that "international communications" and cross-border associations lie at or near the
core of the First Amendment?
Courts and commentators have devoted little attention to this important question.  Most of the theoretical
work relating to the First Amendment seems to assume a domestic context involv ing speakers and audiences
located within U.S. territorial borders.  (Some theorists might simply  assume that even speech directed
primarily  to a foreign audience will almost alway s reach at least some domestic audience as well.)  Does the
search for truth extend to international contacts and cross-border speech?  Does self-
government necessarily  depend upon such things?  If so, how can we justify  allowing the government to limit
alien speakers' entry  -- perhaps even on purely  ideological grounds?  Might self-actualization alone support
international contacts and exchanges?  Or do we need a different justification or theory , one that accounts for
globalization and digitization, for cross-border contacts and exchanges?     
There is relatively  little legal, historical, or precedential support for robust protection of cross-border
contacts.  The Supreme Court has only  grudgingly  assumed that the First Amendment is implicated by  some
restrictions on foreign travel.  Trade laws continue to restrict a variety  of collaborative arrangements
involv ing foreign authors, artists, and scientists.  Citizens and resident aliens have no First Amendment right
to represent foreign missions in the U.S.  In more general terms, the legal and regulatory  infrastructure
relating to cross-border information flow, which I alluded to at the beginning of this post, suggests that the
First Amendment applies with less force to cross-border contacts and speech than it does to domestic speech
activ ities.  This is especially  true where national security  concerns are raised, as is obv iously  the case where
FTOs are concerned. 
In sum, the supposition seems to be that "international" contacts and communications lie closer to
the periphery of the First Amendment than to its core.  We need to think much more carefully  about how and
why  the First Amendment applies to cross-border contacts and expression.  That issue will only  become more
important as new cross-border channels of communication are opened.  
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